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Abstract: This paper notes that different nation’s approaches to innovation and industrial policy 
impact on the range of renewable energy policy options available, the choices that are made and 
the aims that underlie them.  It considers those policies which have been most successful in 
stimulating installed wind energy capacity and industrial growth in wind turbine manufacturing 
in Denmark, Germany and Spain with a view to the instruments employed and the context of 
their employ, that is, within more coordinated economies.  This is compared with the greater 
constraints on nations with more liberal economies, specifically the UK, and the less impressive 
results achieved therein.  The range, flexibility and impacts of central support mechanisms and of 
additional policy instruments operating alongside them are also considered with a view to 




Alongside the environmental goals which attach to renewable energy policy, there are a number 
of other goals set within national policy frameworks.  Besides the desire for greater economy and 
energy security is the wish to see the stimulus of new industrial opportunity.  It is clear that 
different policy instruments have the potential to engender different impacts on manufacturing 
industries and their potential for accessing competitive international marketplaces. 
This paper discusses the factors impacting on industrial growth of RET manufacturing from the 
perspective of applied policy.  It has specific regard for the wind turbine manufacturing industry 
as the most mature of the new RET industries.  It considers the context in which national policies 
relating to renewable energy are developed and the significance given to the potential to stimulate 
RET manufacturing within the context of that policy.  Relevant aspects of National Innovation 
Systems (NIS) as they have applied to the development of wind turbine manufacturing are 
discussed, both with regard to the limits they place on available policy options and to the 
advantages that may arise in some NISs which are not available in others, most specifically 
where they have implications for industrial policy.  The potential for more liberal economies to 
adopt more aggressive industrial policies relating to RET is discussed. 
 
Industrial Development as a Goal and Shaper of Renewable Energy Policy 
 
The stated aims of different national renewable energy policies are manifold.  The common 
central aims tend to be the capture of environmental benefits; the capture of other social and 
economic benefits such as increased employment opportunities; increased manufacturing and 
export capability and increased energy security, as well as a number of more nationally specific 
goals. 
Whilst most nations do not apply any form of explicit ranking with regard to these goals it is 
apparent that different political actors give greater emphasise to some goals than to others.  The 
policies instruments they apply reflect the level of priority they give to the whole basket of goals. 
This paper concerns itself with the emphasis given to the creation of new industrial opportunities 
by the various national political actors in providing support for renewable energy development.  
Given that wind energy technology can be regarded as the technology which has seen the most 
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significant moves towards becoming a mature technology, emphasis is placed on the historical 
development of the wind turbine manufacturing industry and of policies which have both failed 
and succeeded in nurturing it.  A number of nations have subsidised wind energy with the 
professed aim of this leading to the creation of a thriving and internationally competitive 
industry.  The most successful historically have been Denmark, Germany and Spain, though the 
US-owned GE Wind, formerly Enron Wind, has also enjoyed some success.  It should be noted 
that as Enron Wind, the company absorbed a German company, Tacke Windtechnik, which is 
responsible for a significant fraction of the companies historic production, and notably in the 
context of this paper had been the subject of significant industrial policy benefits in Germany 
(Johnson and Jacobsson 2003).  GE Wind is also vulnerable to fluctuations in the unstable US 
market.  The top ten turbine manufacturers in 2001 are shown in Table 1, along with the 
historical capacity they have produced.  Each of Denmark, Germany and Spain has employed a 
tariff based mechanism as their central policy instrument.   
 
TABLE 1. Top ten suppliers, 2001 










Vestas (Denmark) 3335 1648 24.1% 4983 20.0%
Enercon (Germany) 2170 1036 15.2% 3206 12.9%
NEG Micon (Denmark) 3636 874 12.8% 4510 18.1%
Enron (US) 1423 865 12.7% 2288 9.2%
Gamesa (Spain) 1476 648 9.5% 2125 8.5%
Bonus (Denmark) 1713 593 8.7% 2306 9.3%
Nordex (Germany) 1013 461 6.7% 1473 5.9%
MADE (Spain) 592 191 2.8% 783 3.1%
Mitsubishi (Japan) 379 178 2.6% 558 2.2%
REpower (Germany) 246 133 1.9% 379 1.5%
Others 3034 448 6.6% 3482 14.0%
Total  19,017 7075  26,092  
 
       Source: (Gipe 2002)/(BTM Consult ApS 2002) 
 
Danish companies remain dominant, though their share of the world market has steadily reduced 
through the late 1990’s and into the 21st century.  Danish companies have historically dominated 
their domestic market with 100% of sales, and non-Danish companies have tended to avoid even 
trying to compete.  It is also important to note that figures for the world market tend to be 
somewhat skewed by the strong performance of German companies in their own home market, 
where they have typically captured 55-65% of demand in recent years.  The size of the German 
market – typically around 35-40% of the total world market – means that German companies thus 
enjoy a significant share of the world market which perhaps does not reflect in their performance 
outside Germany.  This has significance in respect of the long term industrial goals of German 
RE policy. 
One interpretation of the situation is that there is a direct link between the greater industrial 
success noted for the industries of those nations where a tariff mechanism has been employed, 
and that the mechanism is intrinsically superior.  This paper notes there are a number of 
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characteristics that make a tariff mechanism more appropriate to the particular policy strand of 
stimulation of new industrial development, most importantly, the stability that a tariff mechanism 
creates that is not apparent with a quota mechanism.  However, it also suggests that the use of the 
tariff mechanism can be regarded as being indicative of a particular cultural approach to the 
support of new technology and industry.  Those countries which are unwilling to entertain the use 
of a mechanism with so little foundation in the market may be limiting their options with the 
result that they are less able to access particular policy outcomes.  For example, they may prove 
less able to stimulate their own industrial sectors to capture international market opportunities or 
be competitively disadvantaged in comparison with companies emerging from states which are 
more flexible.  Further, the same cultural foundations which allow governments greater access to 
a choice between tariff and quota mechanisms also provide greater scope for the use of additional 
supporting mechanisms which in themselves may provide additional support to achieving the full 
range of political goals.  More specifically, national industrial cultures which are more amenable 
to the use of tariff mechanisms – which in themselves may offer advantages in terms of providing 
stable domestic markets – seem more likely to be open to a wider range of supporting policy 
instruments which specifically address the growth of competitive domestic industry. 
 
There are effectively two issues relating to the use of policy instruments to stimulate increased 
use of particular RETs.  The first is the degree to which a particular mechanism stimulates a 
demand for technology within a country drives a capacity increase; doing this successfully works 
towards achieving the environmental goals of RE policy as well as providing increased security 
and diversity.  The second issue is the nature of the driver in terms of stimulating a domestic 
industry relating to that increased demand.  One does not lead to the other as demonstrated in 
both the UK and Sweden (Mitchell 1995; Johnson and Jacobsson 2003).  Providing sufficient 
funding from the public purse through either tariffs or quotas leads to increased capacity.  Simply 
stimulating demand does not create a domestic industry nor does a particular mechanism offer 
greater advantage with regard to capture of markets by domestic companies.  Some policies 
clearly offer the potential to be manipulated at the national level to offer advantage to domestic 
companies.  Underlying this however is the context in which policies are created, and which can 
act to limit the availability of policy options, both with regard to the central mechanisms and 
support mechanisms.  Those countries adhering more closely to market mechanisms – liberal 
market economies – will interfere less in the markets, may have more barriers to doing so, or may 
not have the institutions in place which allow this to be carried out with more ease.  Co-ordinated 
market economies may be at an advantage. 
 
As has been noted, there are a range of motivations for nations and regions in developing 
renewable energy policy.  Fundamentally, the basis for policy stems from the environmental 
benefits that accrue from using renewable energy sources as an alternative to fossil fuel.  Whilst 
this justifies the desire to see increased RE use, the capture of environmental benefits is a general 
issue; it leaves the question of how it can best be met to political actors.  Thus, whilst this factor 
is the underlying justification of policy, the creation of policy may also take into account other 
potential benefits that may accrue from more or less aggressive policies in the area; be they 
financial or regulatory in nature.  Increased security of supply through exploitation of increased 
diversity of indigenous energy sources is desirable and positively influences balance of 
payments, Other potential policy goals include aiding rural regeneration, as in the UK (DTI 
2000), and the potential for stimulating community involvement through the use of co-operatives, 
as occurred in Denmark (Tranæs 1997). 
Fundamentally however, the exemptions to international trade rules that allow the provision of 
state aid to assist the development of new environmentally beneficial technology may also prove 
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more amenable in advantaging domestic industry to the detriment of non-domestic, and the 
application of instruments that allow this may be more easily applied in some nations than others. 
 
Industrial development of Wind Energy Technology 
 
A significant number of factors impinge on the development of new industries, and this remains 
true for wind energy generating technology.  The success of a new industrial sector can be judged 
in two contexts; the domestic marketplace and the international marketplace. 
 
Success in the domestic marketplace has been demonstrated to be an essential foundation for the 
development of an internationally competitive industry; this is also the area where a nation can 
most easily act to support its own economic and social interests.  Further to this, fundamental to 
the growth of a domestic industry is the formation of a stable domestic market, which inevitably 
means a stable demand (Porter 1990; Johnson and Jacobsson 2003).  Thus to be serious about 
trying to stimulate a new internationally competitive industry, a nation must provide policy which 
delivers a stable demand for the goods provided by the new industry, should such a demand not 
already exist. 
With regard to the establishment of wind turbine manufacturing it is apparent that some nations 
have adopted policies which lend themselves ably to the creation of a more stable demand.  
Notably, the nations whose companies which currently dominate the wind turbine manufacturing 
sector have been careful to provide regulatory and fiscal assistance to ensure a continuing 
demand for turbine production, this is perhaps particularly notable where circumstances have 
meant the industry has faced leaner demand. 
A tariff mechanism, as has already been noted provides a much more stable financing 
environment for the development and operation of wind turbines.  There are various examples of 
other policies which have also helped with stabilising demand both alongside a tariff mechanism 
or prior to its adoption.  Danish examples include the 1988 agreement between the Danish 
Government and utilities which saw the utilities agree to purchase 100MW of turbine capacity 
and effectively prevented the total disintegration of the Danish sector following the collapse of 
the California market which had been created through federal and state tax breaks.  Essentially, 
the creation of a Californian market in the 1980’s acted to draw existing wind turbine companies 
from around the world and to expand the sector with new entrants.  Danish manufacturers, with 
superior technology resulting from the particular characteristics that had driven the small home 
market quickly came to dominate a large portion of the market, in Karnøe’s interpretation, 
because of superior technical knowledge gained as a result of servicing a more sophisticated 
marketplace (Karnøe 1990).  When tax breaks were repealed and the market collapsed, many of 
the non-Danish companies went out of business and the danger was that most of the Danish 
companies would follow, with a concomitant loss of the knowledge and expertise gained both 
before and as a result of the Californian experience.  Essentially the government acted to stabilise 
demand until it could put into place a more permanent mechanism for driving demand.  Detailed 
accounts of the California situation and of the early history of the Danish wind turbine 
manufacturing industry with regard to contributing political, social and economic factors have 
been provided by a number of authors (Karnøe 1990; Gipe 1995; Jørgensen and Karnøe 1995).  
A detailed account of the development of both wind turbine technology and of industrial growth 
internationally can be found in Heymann (Heymann 1998). 
Denmark has recently seen a similar agreement for purchases of five 150-160MW offshore wind 
farms was agreed between the government and utilities with construction to take place between 
2002 and 2008.  Two of these projects will act as pilot projects, and further development will rest 
on their performance.  The first, a 160MW farm at Horns Rev has been completed, whilst the 
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second, a158MW farm will be constructed at Rodsand.  This demand may well have helped to 
stabilise Danish domestic demand following the initial – and eventually postponed introduction – 
of a quota mechanism which had undermined security relating to investment, and thus financial 
viability of development and thus seriously destabilised domestic sales. 
The status of Danish turbine manufacturers as first movers meant that Denmark had not had to 
interfere with the market with large-scale instruments which offer preference to domestic 
customers.  The initial advantage in technology meant that non-Danish companies were incapable 
of competing effectively in Denmark, and the advantage has been maintained through an 
intensely competitive environment, though it is possible that some advantage is garnered through 
the application of safety regulations which cause costs to fall disproportionately on non-domestic 
companies.  It is possible that the rapid expansion of offshore wind in Denmark might open up 
the market, with implications for the future development of the Danish turbine industry. 
What is apparent from the historical development of the Danish wind sector have been the close 
ties between industry, the Government, and its agents, and which has existed since the early days 
of the industry.  Close consideration allowed the easy transfer of results from government R&D 
to commercial usage as well as aiding in providing the new industry with legitimacy.  
Mechanisms to aid transfer were specifically put in place, and these drew in the involvement of 
both the Ministries of Energy and of Industry.  These R&D efforts were carried out by both 
public and private sectors and backed with public funds to try to ensure commercial products.  
This close collaboration, beginning as long ago as the late 1970’s, has continued to the present, 
though the form of the support has changed considerably in that period (Øster and Jacobsen 
1990; Pedersen 1990). 
 
Whilst Danish wind turbine manufacturers have clearly benefited from the country’s status as 
first movers within the industry, entrants to the sector from other nations have required more 
support domestically to overcome in order to be able to combat Danish dominance. 
Germany can be regarded as being the major success story of the renewables sector with an 
installed capacity of 12GW of wind power out of the world total of 31.2GW at the beginning of 
2003 (WPM 2003).  German installed capacity at the beginning of 1990 was less than 20MW and 
the rate of expansion necessary to the present has dwarfed that in other nations.  However, 
German companies have experienced problems in achieving significant penetration into 
international markets, where Denmark continues to dominate, though this is slowly beginning to 
change.  If Germany is to recoup some of its investment in wind technology through capture of 
significant portions of the turbine manufacturing sector – and the concomitant economic and 
social benefits this would imply – it is forced into a position where it must continue to provide 
subsidy, preferably in an environment which directs advantage towards domestic manufacturers, 
rather than fuelling purchases from overseas suppliers.  The central problems with this are 
twofold.  Firstly, Germany may run out of economically viable sites to exploit before its 
companies have made sufficient inroads into the international market.  The German Wind Energy 
Institute has suggested that German installation rates peaked in 2002 and are likely to fall 
annually until 2008, when it is hoped that increased offshore sales will push figures back up 
(Molly 2002).  They note that BTM Consult, the leading wind industry consultant suggest figures 
will begin to rise again from 2004.  Secondly, each year Germany, or more precisely German 
electricity consumers, must meet both the costs of current commitments of those turbines already 
installed, plus the new turbines installed that year.  The rapid rate of expansion has applied both 
to capacity and costs and thus will eventually render the tariff mechanism economically and 
politically insupportable, despite the changes that were made in the restructuring of the tariff 
mechanism in 2000.  Key to Germany seeing a long-term return on its investment other than with 
regard to reduced emissions, is being able to maintain both a stable domestic market and one that 
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is more amenable to its own companies, at least until they have become more established outside 
the German market.   
That Germany has industrial ambitions in the sector is clear.  German companies dominate their 
domestic market and have done so since Germany began to develop its wind resources in 1990. 
Alongside both incarnations of its tariff mechanism, Germany has employed a number of 
additional instruments, ostensibly aimed at aiding the growth and penetration of capacity.  
Johnson and Jacobsson detail how many of these instruments have also been to the specific 
benefit of German turbine manufacturing companies, allowing them to remain in business and to 
develop their technologies in the face of superior Danish technology and more experienced 
manufacturers. 
An example of German industrial policy at work is the 100MW/250MW programme.  Introduced 
in 1990 to support the original German tariff mechanism, this provided an additional 6pfg/kWh 
to the 16.52pfg/kWh of the tariff.  Gipe records Uwe Cartensen of the German Wind Energy 
Association as suggesting that the subsidy from the BMFT was directed to projects such that 
German turbine manufacturers were favoured, pointing out that over two-thirds of the subsidy 
funding went to projects using German built turbines.  Johnson and Jacobsson’s research 
highlights how the application procedure allowed manipulation of awards to favour German 
industry (Johnson and Jacobsson 2003).  They also provide evidence of further support for 
German industrial efforts provided at the regional level where schemes again ostensibly aimed at 
stimulating capacity displayed notable bias towards local manufacturers. 
A further German policy of note is the large-scale provision of ‘soft’ loans, that is, loans which 
are available significantly below market rates.  These are available both through national and 
regional institutions.  Lindley (Lindley 1996) has suggested that the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank 
DtA had had one of the most dramatic influences of any single institution on renewable energy.  
Its 2003 merger with Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), another significant source of funds 
for RE seems unlikely to herald a significant change in the support it provides to wind energy 
projects1.  The result of the merger, the KfW-Mittelstandsbank (or SME bank) remains under the 
control of the state and the regions.  This form of support is typical of the German system of 
industrial control, wherein the state acts – as Weiss has it – as the co-ordinator of ‘last resort’ 
(Weiss 1998) pp70).  Weiss also notes that the German State has historically acted to compete 
internationally through the mobilisation of large amounts of capital by creating publicly funded 
financial institutions (Weiss 1998) pp120).  Whilst it is not possible to provide data which clearly 
demonstrates that funding goes preferentially to German manufactured turbines, this would be in 
line with German industrial policy historically.  Further to this point, the domination of a 
majority of the German market by German manufacturers - who struggle to compete outside the 
German market - would suggest that some advantage is being provided to German companies 
that is not available to non-domestic companies. 
Effectively, German industrial policy has, at its base, significant interdependence between 
financing, industrial and government institutions.  This interconnection allows government to 
focus on sectors where it wishes to see stimulation of industrial development.  This gives a closer 
working relationship and allows greater responsiveness from government to aid the sector should 
circumstance cause it to be stymied. 
 
Spanish policy at the national level has been founded on the twin bulwarks of a national tariff 
mechanism and generous capital subsidies.  However, regional policies have also played an 
important in both making wind energy projects economic and in encouraging the growth of new 
turbine manufacturers.  Spain’s hierarchical system of governance, with considerable power 
                                                 
1 See http://www.kfw-mittelstandsbank.de/mportal/English/English.jsp 
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devolved to relatively low levels has meant that regions have been able to act to remove barriers 
to wind turbine deployment where opportunity for resource exploitation has existed.  The result 
has been that Spanish capacity has increased from 7MW in 1990 to 115MW in 1995, and on to 
4830MW by the start of 2003 (WPM 2003). 
Spanish policy on capturing the industrial benefits of investing in increasing wind turbine 
generating capacity has been more straightforward than in Denmark and Germany.  Effectively 
acting to stimulate an industry in competition with both Denmark and Germany has required 
policies which encourage entrants and allow them access to markets.  Spanish efforts have been 
aided by the existence of small manufacturers in existence prior to the big Spanish push on 
capacity, but also by the degree of legitimacy that has been brought to the industry by the 
commitment of all relevant actors including national, regional and municipal government, 
utilities keen to develop their own manufacturing and development arms and local investors and 
farmers keen for a new source of income. 
Particular regions have allowed applications for licenses only from companies committing to 
develop production within their boundaries.  Galicia, for example, required the submission of a 
‘strategic wind power plan’, detailing the commitment that the manufacturers would make in 
supporting the regional growth of manufacturing of turbines. Commitments could be fulfilled 
either through the establishment of factories through the developers associated manufacturing 
arms, or by purchasing equipment from other manufacturers within the region.  A minimum of 
seventy percent of turbines had to be manufactured locally.  The scale of the capacity available 
through the licences on offer ensured that a large amount of bids were attracted, and the initial 
undertaking of 2550MW was oversubscribed.  By 2000, twelve plants were producing equipment 
in the region, providing 650 jobs.  Similar schemes have been employed in other Spanish regions. 
It seems clear that replication of this licensing policy, used in a number of Spanish regions, 
would not be an easy task in a number of political constituencies, where it will likely prove 
antithetical to those favouring an open a market as possible.  Certainly, its adoption was not 
considered within the UK consultation process which led to the current UK mechanism, the 
Renewables Obligation.  Support mechanisms in the UK have been notable for the advantages 
they have failed to create.  The initial introduction of the NFFO came too early in the UK’s 
efforts to support renewables, effectively preceding any stimulation of companies to exploit the 
markets it created.  The result was to provide a market for turbine manufacturers from Denmark 
and elsewhere (Mitchell 1995).  The attitude of the UK to development of competitive RE 
industries might be best summed up with a 1995 statement by the then Energy Minister, that “the 
NFFO process does not provide a privileged position for UK equipment suppliers, but the 
Government believes that this is as it should be.  Suppliers must be able to compete in world 
markets if they are to succeed so, ultimately, it does not help to protect them at home” (Welsh 
Affairs Committee 1995).  The UK has tended to remain true to this statement, with public funds 
being made available to support technology development at minimum short-term cost to the 
consumer.  It is possible however, that some of the policy instruments introduced alongside the 
RO have the potential to be used to support UK industry preferentially, though this remains to be 




The choice of RE support mechanism reflects the particular nation that produces it, and the 
national innovation system and style of economic governance of its society.  Nations which 
refuse to consider a tariff mechanism do so through a commitment to addressing market failures 
through the use of instruments which are as near-market as possible in the belief that this entails 
the least costs to the market and the consumer.  Nations which thus reject the use of a tariff 
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mechanism in the belief it is likely to prove too costly, and on the basis that it interferes too 
greatly with the efficient operating of the market are also more likely to reject other mechanisms 
which also create greater market interference where another option is open to them.   Whilst 
Menanteau et al (Menanteau, Finon et al. 2003) present evidence that the tariff mechanism is 
anyway more efficiency owing to the uncertainties that persist in quota mechanisms, it is possible 
that the ability to choose a tariff mechanism is indicative of a more flexible approach to achieving 
policy goals.  It is suggested here that hose nations which have adopted the tariff option, do so at 
least in part for reasons relating to the potential for securing advantage in the manufacturing 
sector.  They desire to see social as well as economic return on investment at the national level, 
tend to have a culture more historically rooted in government interference with the development 
of new technology and industries, and are more likely to consider the wider range of options.  
Systems which allow the consideration of tariff mechanisms also allow the greatest range of 
potential for additional mechanisms to be used alongside them to address disadvantages in their 
use or to make their use more specific to additional policy goals.  Those that adhere to market 
mechanisms may not allow themselves to access the full range of policy benefits.  This can be 
seen as a function of systems which have the scope to consider policy instruments which are both 
market and non-market based. 
The greater range of options thus available allows greater flexibility in choosing from more 
policies which are more amenable to stimulating RE policy goals other than that of capacity 
increase.  It can be noted particularly that this extended range of policy options may offer greater 
opportunity for the manipulation of markets to favour domestic manufacturers. 
To sum up, the domination of the turbine manufacturing industry by companies coming from 
those countries which have primarily relied on tariff mechanisms may more specifically represent 
a link between industrial domination of the turbine industry and countries which allow the 
possibility of using a tariff mechanism, that is to say, it is a product of the industrial policy of the 
nation in question.  The industrial policy is a product of the form of the economy in question. 
The conclusion that there is a link may have important implications.  These implications may 
include, but are not necessarily limited to; 
 
• The applicability of policy instruments for stimulating further new technologies and new 
industries to produce those technologies; 
• The potential for countries whose industrial policies suggest less flexibility to capture the 
market for new technologies; 
• The potential for less flexible countries to become more flexible with regard to the range 
of policy instruments they are willing to consider. 
 
Clearly, tariff mechanisms can be easily applied to the development of further new RE 
technologies, as can many of the policies which currently accompany them in the nations that 
enjoy enough flexibility to adopt them.  The use of quota mechanisms to stimulate technologies 
which are not near market when the mechanism is adopted is more complex.  There is some 
potential for the use of ‘banding’ – having separate quotas for different technologies – though 
this can be seen to be at odds with the central justifications that the mechanism is closest to 
market conditions and ensures least cost to the consumer.  In the UK at least, this was grounds for 
the rejection of banding during the adoption of the Renewables Obligation quota mechanism.  
Providing a stable market with a quota mechanism as the central focus could thus prove to be 
more difficult for newer technologies than is the case for currently competitive technologies, 
leaving significant problems for their stimulation market readiness and, more particularly, for 
supporting the development of national competitive advantage in the market for those new 
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technologies.  Countries which accept tariff mechanisms can simply add a new rate for a new 
technology.   
Germany has tended to use the additional mechanisms to provide domestic companies with an 
advantage, whilst the tariff mechanism merely provided the stimulus for a stable demand.  Quota 
mechanisms such as the RO provide both a less stable market and are too transparent to be easily 
turned to being used preferentially.  The liberal economic preferences of the UK also mean that 
there is less inclination to apply additional support mechanisms to providing advantage to 
domestic companies.  The provision of grants for specific technologies, as in the UK seems 
unlikely to create a long term stable market for these technologies, returns the Government to a 
position of having to pick winners and is likely to be politically unacceptable in some 
constituencies.  At least one new policy in the UK, the Carbon Trust’s Low Carbon Innovation 
Programme offers the potential to support UK companies preferentially, though currently its 
typical available funds are only £25-30 million p.a.  Most existing UK policies seem likely to be 
unable to be applied on a preferential basis due to the level of transparency associated with them. 
 
So what options are available for less flexible countries, with less coordinated economies, to 
achieve competitive advantage in markets for renewable energy technologies?  It would certainly 
appear that they are at some disadvantages; nevertheless this does not imply that they are fated to 
be subordinate to more flexible countries.  Firstly, it must be noted that whilst a nation may apply 
elements of industrial policy to one RE technology does not imply it will do the same for another 
technology.  Johnson and Jacobsson emphasise that before industrial policy can be applied other 
factors impinge on the potential for growth.  Entrants to a new industrial sector must be induced, 
for example, and Johnson and Jacobsson highlight the importance of the early legitimacy that 
political consensus gave to wind turbine technology which stimulated a variety of entrants to the 
sector in Germany and the Netherlands.  No assumption can be made regarding the conditions 
that will apply to further new RE technologies in any of the nations which might or might not 
wish to develop them. 
Further factors also apply; the necessity for a stable domestic market in ensuring international 
competitiveness places geographical limitations on countries to develop technologies only where 
they have relevant national RE resources, thus competition for new industry to meet policy 
driven demand will differ between technologies.  Additionally, the costs of using a tariff 
mechanism are substantial, the returns are not guaranteed, and even where returns are made, the 
initial investment may not always be politically supportable, and may grow less so with each new 
technology supported concurrently. 
We have seen in the wind turbine manufacturing sector that acting as the first mover on a national 
basis may provide a significant baulk for domestic companies against future entry to the market 
by companies from other nations buoyed by national market creation programmes.  Thus, being 
the first nation to stimulate a domestic industry may prove to be even more important to those 
countries with less policy flexibility.  This is of course not straightforward.  Such a course could 
require additional commitments to supporting a wide range of technologies and perhaps a return 
to trying to pick winners which may prove to be anathema to policymakers in more liberal 
economies. 
The alternative is the potential for more co-ordinated economies to adopt instruments which 
provide industrial policy advantages to domestic industry.  Again however, there are cultural and 
institutional barriers to such an adoption that may prove difficult to overcome. 
A key issue identified within the German and Dutch wind turbine R&D programmes was a 
greater emphasis on diversity of effort, that is, of working to acquire knowledge of different 
forms of the technology, rather than focussing too early on one aspect as was the case in a 
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number of territories with regard to the development only of MW sized turbines (Johnson and 
Jacobsson 2003).  This may be a useful lesson with regard to other new RETs. 
Johnson and Jacobsson underline repeatedly the importance that establishing the legitimacy of a 
technology played in helping to support the growth of virtuous circles of resource supply, market 
development and growth.  Political support which aims to assist the growth of such legitimacy for 
new technologies should thus be a key aspect of policy in the early stages of technological 
development, and beyond.  One key factor common to development in Denmark, Germany and 
Spain has been the close ties between government, industry and other national institutions such as 
banks or other sources of finance.  In each country this allowed and continues to allow greater 
responsiveness in policy creation.  Developing closer ties between these actors in other countries 
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